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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the evolution of biotechnology clusters in Germany between 1996 
and 2003, paying particular attention to their respective composition in terms of venture 
capital, basic science institutions and biotechnology firms. Drawing upon the 
significance of co-location of “money and ideas”, the literature stressing the importance 
of a cluster’s openness and external linkages, and the path dependency debate, the paper 
aims to analyse how certain cluster characteristics correspond with its overall 
performance. After identifying different cluster types, we investigate their internal and 
external interconnectivity in comparative manner and draw on changes in cluster 
composition. Our results indicate that the structure, i.e. to which group the cluster 
belongs, and the openness towards external knowledge flows deliver merely 
unsystematic indications with regard to a cluster’s overall success. Its ability to change 
composition towards a more balanced ratio of science and capital over time, on the 
other hand, turns out as a key explanatory factor. Hence, the dynamic perspective 
proves effective illuminating cluster growth and performance, where our explorative 
findings provide a promising avenue for further evolutionary research. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
There is a rather long and well established tradition to regard ‘clusters’, ‘industrial 
districts’ or ‘regional innovation systems’ as favoured locations for the production of 
goods, services and knowledge (e.g. (Audretsch/Feldman (1996); Bresnahan et al. 
(2001)). Here, one camp has been arguing that firms, industries and knowledge are 
becoming more and more footloose and economic activities progressively take place 
regardless of physical distance. In such a ‘weightless economy’ (Quah (1997); Coyle 
(1997)), geography is treated more or less as historical relict (Ohmae (1990); Cairncross 
(1997)).  
A counter-movement follows a radically different line of thinking. According to this 
view, spatial proximity enhances the competitiveness of firms by facilitating the types 
of interrelations and interactions that keep organisations in place and foster processes of 
learning and innovation by means of face-to-face contacts, ‘local buzz’, localised 
capabilities and the like (e.g. Maskell/Malmberg (1999); Storper/Venables (2004)). In 
this line of reasoning, proximity acts as a basic governance mechanism in that it reduces 
transaction costs by establishing helpful local codes and a common language. Similarly, 
Morgan (2004) warned before accepting views regarding the supposed death of 
geography, as knowledge creation still depends on localised interaction to a large extent. 
Thus, a specific geographical configuration of economic activity is seen as playing a 
crucial role in determining the future prospects of firms and industries.  
Many of the characteristics of the knowledge-intensive sectors point in the direction 
of this line of argument. According to Leamer/Storper (2001), these sectors – while 
permitting a decentralisation of certain routine activities – contribute to reinforce urban 
concentration and agglomeration. Economic success in the knowledge-intensive 
services often hinges on the creation of networks, on social interaction, locally based 
tacit knowledge and personal contacts – factors whose genesis is significantly facilitated 
by geographical closeness (compare in more detail Zademach (2005)). As spatial 
expression of this phenomenon, the emergence of strong clustering effects, such as the 
concentration of high-technology industries in Silicon Valley, the Boston or the 
Cambridge area, are found all around the globe. However, discussions about the cluster 
phenomenon concentrate only on a handful of famous clusters. Several locations that 
start off with favourable conditions did not takeoff but sunk into oblivion. The 
concentration on the few successful clusters has many researchers and policy analysts 
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led to a kind of recipe approach: Take a university, locate some investors around, 
initiate entrepreneurship lessons and the cluster economies will start off.  
This paper addresses the mechanisms pushing regions to extraordinary performance. 
Building on Powell et al’s (2002) work on the biotechnology industry in the US in 
which they addressed the relationship between science institutions, venture capital (VC) 
and biotechnology firms and identified the significance of ‘co-location of money and 
ideas’, the case of the biotechnology industry in Germany serves as testing ground. The 
analysis proceeds from a triad of conceptual starting points. In essence, we investigate 
first the extent to which the clusters composition (i.e. proportion between locally-based 
science and capital), second their external linkages, and third their evolutionary 
trajectories correspond to their respective performance levels. By this means, we do not 
merely emphasize if, but also on how clusters change over time. That is, by looking on 
several clusters showing a wide heterogeneity of performance, we explore their 
respective configuration, degree of openness and internal interconnectedness, as well as 
structural transformation over time.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section draws relevant 
theoretical considerations from the related literature. Section 3 briefly sketches the 
characteristics of the human biotechnology industry. Section 4 specifies the methods of 
the analysis and represents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The literature in business and managerial science highlights that the composition of 
a cluster (Porter (2000, 254)) i.e its configuration in terms of private firms, public 
institutions, governmental regulations, access to capital, sectoral specifications etc., is 
crucial for providing a hotbed for innovative firms (e.g. Feldman (1994)). For nurturing 
innovative firms, science and capital are two essential factors. Substantiating this 
statement, Powell et al. (2002) find that these two factors are strongly regionally 
concentrated in the US hotspots of the biotechnology industry.  
Given the – at least theoretically utterly unrestricted – ubiquitity of capital, one 
might ask for the basic rationales behind the spatial concentration of money and ideas. 
Here, a first key rationale relates to the fact that in high-technology industries, 
innovations are the result of accumulation and a special combination of knowledge, 
namely basic and applied science. Public research institutes not only draw scientists and 
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engineers to a region but also generate knowledge that nearby firms can use. In her case 
study, Saxenian (1994) reports the importance of knowledge transfer between Stanford 
University and firms located in Silicon Valley. Jaffe (1989) documents that university 
research positively impacts patenting by firms in the same region. Feldman/Florida 
(1994) argue that the clustering of innovations is related to the existence of R&D 
institutions, universities and firms in a particular region as main centres of knowledge 
creation. Similarly, Prevezer (1997) finds that the strength of the science base is an 
effective magnet for the entry of biotechnology firms in the USA (compare similarly 
Audretsch/Stephan (1996); Zucker et al. (1998)).  
A second key aspect is the availability of VC with its rather well established role for 
the development of high-technology regions. The private equity market has become a 
major source of financing of start-up firms and has grown, at least until the economic 
downturn at the beginning of the 21st century, at an explosive rate. Empirically, Powell 
et al. (2002, 304) found a strong pattern of spatial concentration in biotechnology and 
VC and state “… that without venture capital and regional agglomeration, the industry 
would not exist in the form that it does today”. The role of locally-based capital might 
appear astonishing at first sight since capital, particularly if compared to knowledge, is 
highly fungible (Clark/Wójcik (2005)). Yet most VC or risk capital investors do not 
only transfer the money; in addition they provide advice and contacts and influence 
management decisions; being able to combine the investment process with such 
influence is one of the distinctive features of venture and private equity capital. As 
problems of asymmetric information, agency and uncertainty are a function of physical 
distance (Porteous (1995)), close geographical proximity between firms seeking and 
institutions providing finance reduces costs and efforts of monitoring and consulting. 
Thus a spatially rather concentrated distribution of innovations and “smart money” may 
be seen distinctly advantageous compared to more dispersed systems (Casamatta 
(2003)). 
Following the argument of Bathelt et al. (2004), the co-location of money and ideas 
can, however, not be regarded the bare source of a regional innovation system’s 
economic and innovative success. Instead, the role of external sources in stimulating 
growth within a cluster has to be taken into account, too. In other words, besides local 
“noise” (Grabher (2002)) fed by the interconnection of local actors, ‘pipes’ pumping 
knowledge from other areas of the nation and the world into the cluster are expected to 
matter for cluster success. The openness of the cluster is of particular importance when 
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the market for the innovation is global. Ties to market actors worldwide keep the cluster 
up to date and provide relations to current and potential collaborators in research and 
commercialisation (Bresnahan et al. (2001); Zeller (2001)).  
However, getting access to external information and partners over pipes requires 
most often accepting high uncertainty and undertaking significant investment. Here, 
some institutions (e.g. government and investors) can play a decisive role, first by 
taking the role of boundary spanners that build the bridge between clusters and non-
local actors over which information flows to the cluster, and second by bringing 
experience from operating in other parts of the world in the cluster. Apart from 
providing money VC firms play a hands-on role in the running of the young companies 
and present relevant sources of management expertise. Though it is generally 
acknowledged that these processes of monitoring, advising and managing are much 
more easily accomplished when the young firm is located nearby, the mere focus on the 
local arena runs also the distinct risk of lock-in effects (e.g. Grabher (1993)). To avoid 
such lock-ins, “consciously open network relations for the influx of external 
information as well as maintaining a certain amount of distrust with respect to 
traditional solutions are important” (Bathelt et al. (2004, 42)). The same mechanism 
holds for the firm level; Several studies show that biotechnology firms involved in an 
intense collaboration network are bringing products to the market faster 
(Rothaermel/Deeds (2004)), attract more capital (Stuart et al. 1999) and are more likely 
to restructure in times of change (Häussler (2005a)). 
Third and lastly, we regard clusters as moving targets with its composition and 
interconnectivity evolving over time. Past cluster studies – at least those addressing 
multiple clusters in comparing manner – have rarely considered the dynamics and 
trajectories of clusters being relevant for their performance. However, the dynamic lens 
is gaining momentum with the accelerated pace of technological innovations and 
increased competition. Changes in the composition of clusters can be understood as an 
evolutionary path; paths thereby show the development of cluster characteristics such as 
growth in number of firms, performance (e.g. patents, products), and structure (e.g. 
science and capital) over certain time spans. Based on the assumption that these paths 
are not fully dependent on former positions, the actors in a cluster or third parties (e.g. 
government) have the ability to influence the paths.  
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The composition of clusters over time may either remain stable, or show the trend 
towards greater divergence respectively convergence. In this regard, several scholars 
provide convincing arguments – e.g. imitation is inherent in human nature, people 
exchange ideas, learn from each other and may be influenced by the same advisors – 
which favour a convergence hypothesis (DiMaggio/Powell (1983)). This hypothesis has 
however hardly ever been tested for cluster evolution. To our best knowledge, the mere 
closely related study is Owen-Smith/Powell’s (2006) comparative investigation of the 
Boston and Bay area clusters. By examining three types of ties – those between 
biotechnology firms, between biotechnology firms and investors, and between 
biotechnology firms and public research organisations – the authors show that the 
clusters network structure shows strong differences in 1994 but resembles in the year 
1999. Broad similarities between clusters today “…can be outcome of divergent 
patterns of development” (p. 3). However, the authors focus only on two very 
successful clusters. Hence, no general conclusion between evolutionary paths and 
cluster performance can be derived.  
3 HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY AS TESTING GROUND  
The biotechnology industry was born when recombinant DNA technology and 
molecular genetics opened a path-breaking method of research. In this industry, it is 
widely recognized that firms tend to agglomerate due to the following rationales for 
spatial clustering. First, the biotechnology industry exemplifies many of the 
characteristics of science-based sectors. Firms must be at the forefront of science to be 
successful market actors. Thus, biotechnology firms are often linked to universities and 
public research institutes that conduct basic and applied science. Second, biotechnology 
is likely to profit from localisation economies because much of its knowledge is tacit 
and uncodifiable (Aharonson/Feldman (2004, 3)). Third, the R&D process, by its very 
nature, is highly uncertain and complex (Häussler (2005b)). On average, during the ten 
to fifteen years it takes to develop a drug to market, the 10,000 compounds that enter 
the process are distilled down to one single marketable drug. Fourth, biotechnology 
firms are dependent on the capital market. Developing pharmaceutical products is 
highly capital intensive; on average, costs to develop a new drug amount to $802 Mio. 
(DiMasi et al. (2003)). Thus, the availability of capital is an important ingredient for 
developing a hotbed for biotechnology firms. 
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In Germany, there was hardly any sign of a biotechnology industry when 
Interferon™, the first drug developed by a biotechnology firm, entered the market in 
1986. The amendment of the Genetic Engineering Act in 1993 significantly improved 
the administrative and legal environment for biotechnological research, raising hope for 
a biotechnology industry in Germany. The initial spark was the BioRegio competition in 
1995, launched by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, which 
aimed to boost the foundations of biotechnology firms around its winner regions. 
Entrepreneurs in life sciences have been motivated by public policy and enormous 
government subsidies to form ventures around those regions.  
The German biotechnology regions provide an excellent environment for 
investigating the structure and evolutionary paths of clusters. The observation period of 
this study starts in 1996 in order to capture the effect of the BioRegio competition, the 
early steps of biotechnology firm foundation in Germany, and to track the development 
of biotechnology firms, science institutions and investors in biotechnology.  
 
4 SPECIFICATION OF ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Before focus is shifted to the empirical results and the examination of the extent to 
which the given theoretical approaches help to explain the performance of German 
biotech clusters, the following section briefly describes the database and reflects on the 
methods applied.  
4.1 Data, methods and cluster identification 
As key source for our investigation serves a compilation of the annual BioCom 
listing of (1) biotechnology firms, (2) public institutes researching biotechnology, and 
(3) investors in biotechnology operating in Germany between 1996 and 2003.
1
 Further 
directories, e.g. Dechema or the Dufa-Index were used to complement the database. 
Separately, we compiled data on risk/venture capitalists investing in biotechnology 
firms by dint of information provided by the magazines “Venture Capital”, “Going 
Public” and “Transcript”, the Venture Economics database, the VC Facts database as 
                                                 
1  BioCom is the largest and most historical independently operating directory for biotechnology in 
Germany.  
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well as company press releases and announcements from the German Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association.
2
 
Concerning the identification of biotech clusters, the literature provides a variety of 
different approaches. They all offer more or less identical results, so that the ‘hot spots’ 
of German biotech are rather well established (e.g. Ernst & Young (2001); BioCom 
(2004, 13)). On basis of our data record, this is once more substantiated: In the present 
study, clusters were identified using the relative Euclidean distances between 
biotechnology firms, research institutes and VC investors in biotechnology. Applying a 
two step-approach, the raw cluster data were first visually selected from a map and then 
analytically refined. Each firm’s, each research institute’s, and each VC investor’s 
postal address was therefore converted into latitude and longitude measurements. 
Subsequently, the objects were mapped with help of MapInfo (a software package 
offering a tool to identify clusters depending on a selectable radius); clusters were 
specified as concentration of an overall minimum of 40 objects, with the individual 
lower thresholds for firms, research institutes and investors being 20, 10 and 2, 
respectively.
3
 A clear leap in the quadratic distances from the cluster objects to the 
cluster centre determines the borders of the clusters.  
For each year during the period of investigation, this means brought forward nine 
clusters, in which a significant share of German biotechnology activities takes place in 
spatially concentrated manner.
4
 All nine regions are compact areas with radii ranging 
from 16.9 km (Hanover) to 60.7 km (Ruhr area). Beside these two, Hamburg, Berlin, 
Göttingen, the Rhine/Main area, Heidelberg as well as Stuttgart and Munich come to the 
fore as the key nodes in German biotechnology. They all explicitly define themselves as 
a biotech region; that is the applied mode of cluster selection let to results that coincide 
with the ‘real world’. The identification and interplay of the cluster participants is 
expressed, e.g. in a regional logo, own webpage with regional firm profiles as well as 
events, regional newsletter, regularly local meetings. In all of the nine clusters one 
institution is representing the region, as well as fostering and bundling the regional 
activities, like Bio-M and BIOPRO for Munich and Stuttgart respectively.  
                                                 
2  Concerning the VC data, BioCom proved less helpful as source of information as it encompasses a 
number of investors that in actual fact did never invest in biotechnology, but other sectors. For the 
objective of this study, it is however rational to include only VC investors that have at least once 
provided capital to a biotech firm. 
3  For a similar mean of cluster demarcation, see Aharonson et al. (2004).  
4  Göttingen fulfils the given classification requirements only from 1999 onwards. 
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Notwithstanding these common characteristics, the evolution of the nine identified 
clusters varies significantly over time. Figures 1 and 2 indicate their differing levels of 
performance measured by the growth of the number of biotechnology firms located in 
each of the identified regions. Figure 1 depicts firm growth in absolute terms, Figure 2 
with reference to an index (setting 1996 to 100).
5
  
[Fig.1 and 2 about here] 
In both figures, Munich and the Ruhr area appear as ‘out performers’, accompanied 
by Berlin showing in absolute terms the highest number of firms over the whole period 
of observation. Göttingen, Hanover, Hamburg and the Rhine/Main area around 
Frankfurt display below average number of firms. In order to examine how the just 
given performance heterogeneity may be explained with reference to the theoretical 
considerations, the investigation comprises three steps. The first one of them classifies 
the different clusters according to their composition. Here, the number of biotech firms 
is confronted with the number of investors on the one hand side and the number of basic 
science institutions on the other. By this means, we identify three different general 
cluster types: the well balanced ones, the basic science-driven ones, and finally the VC-
/investor-dominated ones.  
The second step addresses a cluster’s openness and interconnection with the other 
clusters, but also with firms located outside these key nodes. For this purpose we use the 
amount of VC cash-flows and the number of VC investors that flew within and between 
the cluster objects, i.e. ‘intra- vs. intercluster’ VC flows. In addition, this step of 
analysis also covers the flows of public money and governmental subsidies which have 
to be regarded important impulse transmitters with significant impact on a cluster’s 
genesis and evolution.  
In the third step the cluster’s evolutionary trajectories are investigated by means of 
an index that allows exemplifying how a clusters composition has changed over the 
period of investigation. The composition comprises two variables: number of risk 
                                                 
5 
 We are, naturally, conscious that the sheer number of biotech firms represents a rather limited 
indicator to measure a clusters overall performance. Therefore, we have controlled for the number 
of employees per firm in all clusters on the one hand, and the varying main fields of activity (e.g. 
mainly product firms vs. supplier and service firms) on the other. So far, significant deviations 
compared to the chosen indicator could not be observed. Nonetheless, we consider this an 
important field for future investigation. 
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capital investors and number of basic research institutes. The Cluster Composition 
Index CC-I is calculated according to the following formula: 
 
 
 
BS thereby depicts the absolute number of basic science institutions and VC the number 
of risk capital investors respectively venture capitalists; t denotes the year of 
investigation; i stands for the included clusters; and Ger, finally, corresponds to the 
whole of Germany, i.e. the respective national total.6 Regarding the direction of change, 
we differentiate between clusters shifting towards a more balanced a structure, and 
clusters moving towards a structure that strengthens their specific idiosyncrasies. The 
former direction points to ‘convergence’, the latter to ‘divergence’.  
 
4.2 Empirical results I: Structure and openness 
For the nine identified clusters, Figure 3 shows the total number of research 
institutes as proxy for level of basic science on the abscissa, the total of VC investors as 
measure for the amount of locally available risk capital on the ordinate, and the number 
of biotechnology firms via the size of the respective ‘bubble’ with the total number in 
parentheses. The plot suggests a distinct degree of heterogeneity in the composition of 
clusters; some of them, however, are obviously featured by rather similar 
characteristics. As the most important locations of biotech production in Germany 
(compare also Figure 1, again), Munich and the Ruhr area display the greatest quantity 
of both science and capital. Likewise, the indexed rate of the firm growth (Figure 2) is 
highest in these two locations. In comparison, Hamburg, Hanover, Stuttgart, 
Heidelberg, and Göttingen reveal rather small numbers of research institutes and 
investors. The Rhine/Main area, locating the financial centre Frankfurt, represents the 
second largest concentration of investors, but shows the smallest number of science 
institutions. The direct opposite is true for the capital city of Berlin which is featured by 
a large number of science institutes but relatively few investors.  
[Fig. 3 about here] 
                                                 
6  Via the standardisation by the national average, the index controls for the overall proportion of 
investors and basic science institutions in the German biotechnology sector and thus masters the extent 
to which a cluster is relatively seen either dominated by ‘ideas’ or ‘money’. An index below one 
indicates that the cluster hosts a larger proportion of investors compared to the national average, an 
index greater than one that the cluster houses relatively more science institutions. 
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The exercise of depicting the cluster’s composition in absolute terms gives a first 
idea of the varying types – rather ‘finance-driven’ vs. more ‘science-dominated’ vs. 
‘well-balanced’ clusters – which can be distinguished in the German biotechnology 
landscape. Concerning this matter, the Rhine/Main area around Frankfurt clearly 
represents the money-led player. Berlin, and to a lesser extent Göttingen as well as 
Stuttgart as the borderline case compose the contrasting group of the ‘science-driven’ 
ones (albeit in the case of the latter two, the crucial factor is rather a low number of 
investors than an extraordinary high number of science institutions). The remaining 
clusters Munich, the Ruhr area, Hamburg, Heidelberg and Hanover are – at least at the 
end of the period of investigation – best captured as ‘well-balanced’ in terms of their 
financial and scientific fabrics. 
When we contrast the varying cluster types with their performance, one dominant 
cluster type to be particularly successful can not be identified. The ‘well-balanced’ and 
the ‘science-dominated’ clusters provide above as well as below average performers 
alike. Similarly, Hanover, Göttingen, and the Rhine/Main area prove all a rather 
dissatisfying performance, though they display entirely differing structural 
compositions. When we focus only on the three top performing clusters – Munich, 
Berlin, and the Ruhr area – we find that Munich and the Ruhr area belong to the ‘well-
balanced’ type but step out within this group by showing a particularly large number of 
research institutes and investors. The rather unbalanced Berlin area hosts a large number 
of research institutes but locates only few investors. As first intermediate result, it thus 
has to be stated that no cluster type becomes apparent as clearly superior, and that a 
cluster’s general composition adds only little to explain its economic success.  
In light of this finding, it is now turned to the debate stressing the importance of 
interconnectivity and external linkages. As far data availability allows, Table 1 reports 
the mean number of collaborations with non profit organisations (i.e., universities, and 
research organisation) and for profit firms for all biotechnology firms located in our 
nine clusters.
7
 This distinction reveals information on the science versus technology 
orientation of the firms in the clusters. Companies that intensely collaborate with for 
profit firms are presumably more commercialisation oriented, whereas firms intensely 
collaborating with academic or non academic research organisations are more science 
                                                 
7  Note that only about half of the biotechnology firms in the BioCom yearbooks list their collaborations.  
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intense and yet more distant from selling their invention. This exercise reveals different 
levels of interconnectivity as well as distinct patterns of specialisation.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Among the group of the intense collaborators are firms located in the three 
outperforming clusters – Munich, Berlin, Ruhr area – and in the rather low performing 
Hamburg cluster. Hamburg is catching attention as the cluster with the largest number 
of for profit firms presumably explained by a relative large proportion of service firms. 
In contrast, Heidelberg with the largest number of pure product development firms 
shows the largest number of collaborations with non profit organisations but a rather 
low number of collaborations with firms. Conspicuously, besides their high overall 
interconnectivity, not one of the outperforming clusters is showing a strong 
specialisation in either science- or technology-dominated collaborations. As data 
availability does unfortunately not allow to control for the locational dimension of 
collaboration, i.e. whether the partner is located within or outside the cluster, no 
systematic conclusion concerning the inter- and intracluster connectivity can be drawn. 
The risk capital inflow within and to a cluster is the second aspect of 
interconnectivity we shed light on. For the nine identified clusters as well as the 
remaining part of the country, i.e. the cluster outsiders, Table 2 provides an accordant 
overview that distinguishes between VC cash flows on the one hand side and the 
number of deals on the other. First, the table shows that in absolute terms, regardless if 
from in- or outside, the greatest amount of ‘smart money’ flew in and to Munich. Over 
the period of investigation, more than €1.1 billion have been invested here in 415 single 
deals. In proportion to the total national VC flows between clusters (column 5) and 
those coming from outside of that cluster (column 6), these investments account both in 
terms of total cash flows as well as number of transactions for close to 50%. That is, 
nearly half of all intra-cluster financed projects in the German biotechnology industry 
are heading for Munich. Other areas that succeed in attracting money – though to a 
smaller extent – are the Ruhr area, Berlin, and Heidelberg, attracting 14%, 13% and 
11% respectively from all outside VC flows, i.e. the total national amount of VC less 
the capital circulated within the clusters themselves (column 6). Each of the remaining 
clusters attracts only below 2% of total outside flows. 
[Table 2 about here] 
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These findings underline the extraordinary role played by the Bavarian capital city 
and certainly add to explain the take off of its biotech industry. Yet apart from this 
insight, the external linkages to investors seem to be less indicative in predicting cluster 
success: In particular if the intra-cluster flows (column 2) are compared with the 
outside-cluster flows (column 3), the ones showing a relatively high proportion of 
external flows are not necessarily the out performers. For example, Hanover and 
Heidelberg display the same intra- to outside-cluster flows ratio of about one to three as 
Munich; and the low performer Göttingen attracts among the greatest relative 
proportion of outside flows, namely nearly six times the amount spent within the 
cluster
8
.  
In order to shed some further light on this aspect, Figure 4 displays the accumulated 
cash flows of VC funding within and between the nine identified German biotech 
clusters in dynamic perspective. The two maps distinguish between the time span 1996 
to 2000, i.e. from the beginning of our observations up to the crash of the New 
Economy, and the period 2001 to 2003.9 
[Figure 4 about here]  
Three important findings emerge from the temporally differentiated analysis. First, 
notwithstanding the overall cooling down of VC dynamism, the total amount of 
investments during the second given period exceeds that of the first one. The key driver 
of this development is a significant increase of the mean amount to be invested 
(investments between 1996 and 2000 averaged €1.88 million, from 2001 onwards €2.65 
million), a development which in essence is due to the growing maturity of the 
receptors, shifting, if successful, from their initial seed and start-up stages towards a 
more capital intense expansion stage. Second, it can be observed that not only the 
overall level of VC investments has increased, but also the number of linkages between 
the clusters. With the exception of Hamburg which’s involvement into the interregional 
VC network remained almost entirely unchanged, all clusters multiplied their links to 
external sources of money (and managerial knowledge) on the one hand and their 
investments into proximately located firms on the other. Most notably, this is the case in 
                                                 
8  To some extent, Göttingen’s underperformance concerning this matter can also be attributed to 
limited data availability. 
9  The rationale for taking these two spans of time is rather straightforward and intuitive: While the 
1990s saw an extremely dynamic development of public equity markets in Germany including the 
establishment of the Neue Markt in 1997, the burst of the New Economy bubble in 2000-01 has 
significantly slowed down this dynamic development.  
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Berlin and Stuttgart with an increase of six to eleven and two to seven external links 
respectively. With regard to the share of intra-regional investments, third and finally, a 
pretty variegated picture comes into view. While the majority of our clusters show a 
relatively stable proportion of capital invested within them, internal funding died down 
in Hamburg and the Rhine/Main area; Heidelberg in contrast features above-average 
growth concerning this matter.  
Taken together, the result of the VC flows mapping exercise is rather ambiguous if 
matched with the performance of our clusters: Though all of the three outperforming 
clusters – Munich, Berlin, and the Ruhr area – are intensifying their links to provide 
finance to and receive capital from other clusters, their respective configuration is 
relatively dissimilar with Berlin stepping out as one of the receiver clusters whereas 
Munich finds itself within a tight financing net. That is, internal interconnection as well 
as external linkages both can doubtlessly be regarded important general cluster features 
adding to their overall success, but add merely little to explain their differing 
performance levels. 
Turning, finally, to public money and governmental grants (compare Table A1 in 
the appendix) which, apart from triggering significant economic stimuli, are also to be 
seen as important extra-cluster linkages and potential sources of new ideas and 
knowledge. Again and barely astonishing, Munich, Berlin and the Ruhr area receive by 
far the greatest slice of the cake. This has however to be put into perspective of the 
number of firms in these localities taken as a whole. Accounting for this as well as for 
the overall rather minor level of coverage – take e.g. the 24 million Euro governmental 
means in comparison to the 1.1 billion Euros of VC flowing into Munich –, again, only 
a small and fairly unsystematic piece can be fit into the puzzle that might explain the 
detected variance of cluster performance. 
In sum, it hitherto can be stated that both a cluster’s general composition and its 
openness respectively its degree of external interconnectivity in terms of collaborations 
and financial flows provide a certain, but not yet entirely convincing contribution to 
explain their differing levels of performance; no comprehensible statement is possible, 
how and to which extent a certain relation or degree of interaction contributes to a 
cluster’s competitiveness. For this reason, the following section turns to the 
evolutionary paths and individual trajectories of each cluster and investigates the extent 
to which a cluster’s adjustment abilities correspond to its success.  
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4.3 Empirical results II: Convergence and adaptability 
Addressing the convergence hypothesis, the third and final analytical step reveals 
changes and movements in each cluster’s composition over time. In order to quantify 
the extent to which both the level and the direction of change are related to a cluster’s 
performance, Table 4 lists the relative cluster composition index for 1996 and 2003 as 
the initial and the endpoint in the investigation, i.e. the proportion of investors to basic 
science institutions standardised by the national average.
10
 The last column of Table 4 
depicts the change in the composition from 1996 to 2003.  
With a change of 55% the Munich area has undertaken the strongest structural 
change in cluster composition, followed by the Ruhr area with 31%, Rhine/Main area 
with 13% and Berlin with 12%. If the listed cluster types are now contrasted with their 
respective performance, we find that three of the four most dynamic clusters are the 
ones breeding the largest number of biotechnology firms. Thus, the intensity of change 
serves as rather suggestive indicator for the relationship between dynamics and success 
but does not hold for the Rhine/Main area. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The direction of change represents a second important aspect in this evolutionary 
investigation. With reference to the results of the cluster composition index, Figure 5 
tracks the ‘movements’ of the cluster between 1996 and 2003 in respect of their 
respective configuration, thus clarifying their varying evolutionary paths: While the 
clusters Hamburg, Heidelberg, Hanover, and Stuttgart with a rather well balanced 
composition of ‘money and ideas’ in 1996 remain relatively constant, the other five 
clusters move either towards a more balanced structure (this is the case in Munich, the 
Ruhr area and Berlin), or reinforce their financial or scientific dominance (Rhine/Main 
and Göttingen). 
By connecting these paths with cluster performance, the Rhine/Main area and 
Göttingen suggest that a movement strengthening the orientation of a cluster proves to 
be negatively related to cluster performance. The clusters that start off with a well 
balanced composition and more or less kept it are found to be the middle field players. 
The outperforming ones, in contrast, are those three that move from dominant 
                                                 
10  With an increase of 2.8%, the national average remained almost stable. In 1996, research institutes 
in biotech outreached biotech investors with a factor of 4.24.  
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compositions towards less slanted fabrics. Starting off with investor dominance, Munich 
and the Ruhr area turn to a more balanced structure. Remarkably, both clusters 
undertook the most dynamic structural shift and show the highest relative firm growth 
compared to the other clusters. The German capital Berlin locating the largest number 
of biotech firms over the whole period moved from its science orientation in 1996 to a 
less biased composition.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
The exercise of tracking the starting position and movement of clusters appears to 
provide powerful insights in explaining cluster performance. Clusters that started off 
with a dominant orientation and dynamically managed to change toward a more 
balanced proportion of capital and science are outperforming their counterparts. Hence, 
the dynamic analysis offers a rather convincing explanation for the success of clusters.  
5 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper addresses the evolution of nine biotechnology clusters in Germany between 
1996 and 2003. In essence, three different approaches were tested in respect of their 
explanatory power concerning the detected heterogeneity of performance: First, a 
cluster’s composition in terms of the extent to which it hosts science and capital; 
second, its degree of openness respectively its external linkages to institutions located 
outside the cluster; and third, its trajectories and ability to adapt its configuration over 
time.  
Though we witnessed interplay of varying factors as well as a critical mass 
precondition in all cases and are surely aware that an overall recipe to explain different 
levels of cluster evolution cannot exist, our analysis suggests some strong regularities. 
In this manner, the first two ways of reasoning proved yet some but not convincing help 
to further the understanding of cluster performance. Our analysis shows that it is not 
clearly possible to attribute a certain cluster type to a certain performance level. The 
analysis of interconnectivity provides ambiguous results. Regarding interorganisational 
collaboration as one means of interconnectivity, we find that clusters in which firms are 
intensely cooperating with for profit as well as non profit firms tend to be more 
successful. In terms of financing flows within and between clusters – as another means 
of interconnectivity – the general interconnection proves to be an important factor for 
cluster success but no evidence can be reported regarding the characteristics of 
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involvement (e.g. receiving versus equally receiving and giving). That is, external 
linkages – without denying their general significance for cluster performance – do not 
help to systematically explain the differing success of clusters in breeding high-
technology firms neither.  
The dynamic perspective in contrast, i.e. the view addressing the extent to which 
clusters were able to change their composition over time towards a less slanted structure 
during the period of investigation, showed off as the key criteria for success. Regardless 
of their starting point – science dominated or money led – those clusters which managed 
to move to a more balanced fabric were the outperforming ones. That is, after a cluster 
has taken off and managed to establish itself in the global competition of innovative 
locations, the crucial task is to get it moving towards a balanced portfolio of science and 
capital. This directs to the important but complex task to investigate the factors setting 
clusters in motion and vehicles of incessant movement; our primary, explorative 
indications may provide an avenue for future research on this issue.  
But the presented findings also have immediate implications for politics, business 
management and social science. In political and managerial terms, the constant and 
ongoing evaluation, intervention and direction of cluster composition appear as 
straightforward challenge. The turnover and renewal of cluster composition maintain 
the clusters as successful hotbeds for innovative firms. Regarding the scientific 
community, the results substantiate the role of a dynamic approach tracking 
evolutionary paths when considering firm and cluster performance. Hence, future 
research should focus on the extent to which organisations, institutions and regions are 
willing to rethink themselves and to ‘move’ in that they undertake corresponding 
structural adjustments. While we do not claim to have identified and conceptualised the 
multilayered mechanisms underlying such movements or have answered the causality 
question (i.e. to what extent external and internal interconnections of firms impact on 
cluster configuration and vice versa) in comprehensive manner, our hope is that this 
paper stimulates further explorations in order to understand the on-going creative 
ferment in clusters as social entities. Succeeding evolutionary and comparative studies 
which inter alia apply a more differentiated performance measure – such as firm 
turnover or productivity, for instance – might offer fruitful contributions and further 
deepen our knowledge on the interplay of finance, innovation, and space.  
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APPENDIX 
[A1 about here] 
 
REFERENCES 
Aharonson, Barak, Joel Baum and Maryann P. Feldman (2004), Industrial clustering and the 
returns to inventive activity: Canadian biotechnology firms, 1991-2000, DRUID Working 
Paper No. 04-03. 
Audretsch, David and Paula E. Stephan (1996), Company-scientist locational links: The case of 
biotechnology, American Economic Review 86, 641-652. 
Audretsch, David and Maryann P. Feldman, (1996), R&D spillovers and the geography of 
innovation and production, American Economic Review 86, 630-640.  
Bathelt, Harald, Anders Malmberg, and Peter Maskell (2004), Clusters and knowledge: Local 
buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation, Progress in Human 
Geography 28, 31-56. 
BioCom (2004), BioTechnologie – Das Jahr- und Adressbuch, Berlin: BioCom AG. (also for 
the years 1995-2003) 
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (2004), Förderdatenbank von BMBF / BMWA. 
Bresnahan, Timothy, Alfonso Gambardella, and Annalee Saxenian (2001), ‘Old economy’ 
inputs for ‘new economy’ outcomes: Cluster formation in the new Silicon Valley, Industrial 
and Corporate Change 10, 835-860. 
Casamatta, Catherine (2003), Financing and advising: Optimal financial contracts with venture 
capitalists, The Journal of Finance 58, 2059-2085.  
Cairncross, Frances (1997), The death of distance, London: Orion. 
Coyle, Diane (1997), The weightless world. Strategies form managing the digital economy, 
London: Capstone. 
Clark, Gordon L. and Dariusz Wójcik (2005), Path dependence and financial markets: The 
economic geography of the German model, 1997–2003, Environment and Planning A 30, 
1769-1791. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (1983), The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields, American Sociological 
Review 48, 174-190. 
DiMasi, Joseph, Ronald Hansen, and Henry Grabowski (2003), The price of innovation: new 
estimates of drug development costs, Journal of Health Economics 22, 151-185. 
Ernst & Young (2001), Biotech in Germany, Stuttgart: Ernst & Young.  
Feldman, Maryann P. (1994), The geography of innovation, Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Feldman, Maryann P. and Richard Florida (1994), The geographic sources of innovation: 
Technological infrastructure and product innovation in the united states, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 84, 210-229. 
Grabher, Gernot (1993), The embedded firm. On the socioeconomics of industrial networks, 
London: Routledge.  
Häussler, Carolin (2005a), Marrying, selling, and integrating - Firm restructuring in German 
biotechnology, Working Paper, Munich School of Management..  
 19 
Häussler, Carolin (2005b), Inter-firm collaboration: Valuation, contracting, and firm 
restructuring, Wiesbaden: Gabler.  
Jaffe, Adam (1989), Real effects of academic research, American Economic Review 79, 957-
970. 
Klagge, Britta and Ron Martin (2005), Decentralized versus centralized financial systems: is 
there a case for local capital markets?, Journal of Economic Geography 5(4), 387-421. 
Leamer, Edward and Michael Storper (2001), The economic geography of the internet age, 
Journal of International Business Studies 32, 641-665. 
Morgan, Kevin (2004), The exaggerated death of geography: learning, proximity and territorial 
systems, Journal of Economic Geography 4, 3-21. 
Maskell, Peter and Anders Malmberg (1999), Localised learning and industrial competitiveness, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 23, 167-185. 
Ohmae, Kenichi (1990), The borderless world: Power and strategy in the inter-linked economy, 
New York: Harper Business. 
Owen-Smith, Jason and Walter W. (2006), Accounting for emergence and novelty in Boston 
and Bay Area Biotechnology, in Pontus Braunerhjelm and Maryann Feldman (eds.), Cluster 
Genesis: The emergence of technology cluster and their implication for government 
policies, forthcoming. 
Porter, Michael (2000), Locations, clusters, and company strategy, in Gordon Clark, Maryann 
Feldman P., and Meric Gertler (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253-274. 
Porteous, David J., 1995, The geography of finance: Spatial dimensions of intermediary 
behaviour, Aldershot: Avebury. 
Powell, Walter W., Kenneth Koput, James Bowie, and Laurel Smith-Doerr (2002), The spatial 
clustering of science and capital: Accounting for biotech firm-venture capital relationships, 
Regional Studies 36, 291-305. 
Prevezer, Martha (1997), The dynamics of industrial clustering in biotechnology, Small 
Business Economics 9, 225-271. 
Quah, Danny (1997), Increasingly weightless economies, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2, 
49-56. 
Saxenian, Annalee (1994), Regional advantage: Culture and competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Storper, Michael and Anthony Venables (2004), Buzz: The economic force of the city, Journal 
of Economic Geography 4, 351-370. 
Stuart, Toby, Ha Hoang, and Ralph Hybels (1999), Interorganizational endorsements and the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures, Administrative Science Quarterly 44, 315-349. 
Zademach, Hans-Martin (2005), Spatial dynamics in the markets of M&A, Essays on the 
geographical determination and implications of corporate takeovers and mergers in 
Germany and Europe (Wirtschaft und Raum, Band 12), Munich: Herbert Utz.  
Zeller, Christian (2001), Clustering biotech: A recipe for success? Spatial patterns of growth of 
biotechnology in Munich, Rhineland and Hamburg, Small Business Economics 17, 123-141.  
Zucker, Lynne, Michael Darby, and Marilynn Brewer (1998), Intellectual human capital and the 
birth of US biotechnology enterprises, American Economic Review 88, 290-306. 
